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An Illogical Dilemma 
 
Cloud is a powerful paradigm precisely because it represents a fundamental departure 
from other IT provisioning paradigms.  In particular cloud efficiencies result from 
carefully architecting dynamically re-configurable logical separation of computer 
network resources in lieu of static physical separation. Well-designed cloud-enabled 
services are provisioned in ways that are totally independent of the physical attributes of 
the runtime environment.  This is essentially the definition of “cloud” and why cloud 
services are highly scalable.  (Mell & Grance, 2011) Hence, the most effective cloud 
technical architectures are those that most effectively factor service processes into cloud-
ready virtual machines.  A virtual machine, by definition, is some set of hosted processes 
that is logically separated from other processes and hosts. 
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The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) was established in the 2006 
to coordinate and oversee all U.S. government efforts to develop, certify, and accredit 
devices for sharing information across security domains.    The UCDMO maintains a 
living list of approved devices of this kind.  (Unified Cross Domain Management Office 
(UCDMO), 2014)Traditionally, UCDMO recognizes three types of Cross Domain 
Solutions: transfer solutions, i.e. “guards” that rigorously filter data bits in pre-approved 
message format, and then recompose the passed data on the other side of a system 
security boundary; multilevel security (MLS) systems that allow two way 
communications and/or data transfer at, and/or across, multiple security domains; access 
solutions that allow entry into differing security domains, hosted on the same hardware 
platform, but do not allow transfer across security domains. 
 
Figure 1: Traditional transfer guards use complex, proprietary, Boolean logic to enforce physical 
separation. They are inconsistent with modern cloud virtual architecture. 
 
 
Ideally, a cloud would deliver Cross Domain Services, as with any other cloud service, 
by dynamically provisioning virtual machines to perform the carefully architected 
functional processes necessary to deliver on-demand MLS services.  Of course, for Cross 
Domain Services, the virtual machines must be “assured,” i.e. certified and accredited as 
trustworthy for sharing information across at least one level of security, i.e., from 
Unclassified to Secret, Secret to Unclassified, Top Secret to Secret, etc.  (Note that in 
legacy policy language, “Protection Level” (PL4/5) meant a system, device, or 
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environment was accredited to share across one/two layer(s) of security. (Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI), 2000)) 
 
With that goal in mind, it is hard to imagine processes that are less  “cloud ready” than 
traditional cross-domain transfer solutions.  These traditional guards are logical devices 
used to assure physical separation, a task that was architecturally necessary in the days of 
immature virtual technology.  The complexity required to logically enforce physical 
separation requires several 10’s of millions of specialized lines of code to execute highly 
proprietary, interdependent, Boolean predicates at the bit level.  Likewise, MLS systems 
that are currently on the UCDMO approved list assure physical separation by using 
multiple complex transfer guards placed between subsystem security domains.  
 
A Logical Solution 
 
On the other hand, access solutions are built with modern virtual technology using a few 
10’s of thousands of lines of code.  Access solutions built according to the Multiple 
Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture  (Boettcher, DeLong, JRushby, & 
Sifre, 2008) (Boettcher, DeLong, JRushby, & Sifre, 2008), and at least consistent with 
the NSA High Assurance Platform, have been approved by the UCDMO.  These access 
solutions have therefore proven their ability to provide logical separation between 
security levels such as Unclassified to Secret, Top Secret to Secret, etc.    
 
Complex logical guards that guarantee physical separation by examining bits are no 
longer architecturally necessary because it is now possible to assure logical separation 
across security domains.  Therefore, the target architecture for Cloud Multi-Level Cross 
Domain Services can be virtual machine “stacks” of simple virtual guards on top of 
assured logical separation platforms. A virtual guard could be an assured yes-no switch 
that only needs a few hundred lines of GFE code (e.g. NSA’s Block Access Controller 
(BAC)) to guarantee separation at the policy level.  (McNamee & Heller, 2006)The 
assured logical separation platforms could be approved access solutions.  
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Figure 2: Architecture such as Multiple Independent Layers of Security (MILS), use assured virtual 
technology to guarantee logical separation. 
 
In the Defense Enterprise, the individuals responsible for accrediting individual devices, 
systems, and/or environments for Information Assurance are called Designated Approval 
Authorities (DAA).  DAAs perform this role according to the specific requirements and 
boundary conditions associated with their particular missions and systems.  Various 
policy changes over the years have aimed to implement more standard approaches, and 
greater reciprocity. (Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 2008) (Department of 
Defense , 2014)  However, DAAs still generally subscribe to the concept that any 
transaction that occurs across the boundaries of their responsibility constitutes 
vulnerability.  Enabling cloud-based, virtual Cross Domain Services described above 
depends on DAAs agreeing to significant departures from the current paradigms for 
Certification and Accreditation (C&A), for example:  
 
The enterprise cloud must inherit the certifications and accreditations of the 
hosted Cross Domain Services. “Inherit” means that all concerned DAAs agree 
that the assurance arguments that led to the original C&A are valid, and remain 
valid, in the new environment.  Today, DAAs rarely agree to inherit assurance 
arguments across their domains.   
 
To achieve cloud efficiencies regarding rapid evolution of capabilities, all 
concerned DAAs must accept the argument that changes to the upstream 
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technology stack – that they do not control - do not change their C&A assurance 
arguments, or alternatively, blindly accept the risk associated with uncontrolled 
changes.  Otherwise, Cross Domain Services must be recertified every time 
changes are made within the enterprise cloud.  Today, DAAs do not accept either 
option.  
 
Certifiers and accreditors tend to have a different perspective on design than 
architects and engineers do.  Information System architects and engineers tend 
think in terms of creating functional layers.  Multiple logical functional layers, 
implemented with software for example, can exist within the same hardware 
device.  
 
Figure 3: Logical assurance arguments that are based on open standards for virtual technology 
support inheritance of security controls. Reuse of the same reference architecture can accelerate 
C&A.  In this figure, use of the legacy term “PL4, PL5” means assured access across 1, 2 security 
levels.  
 
DAAs are legally responsible for the information assurance of specific, well-
defined physical systems, not abstract enterprises. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses 
that adversaries can potentially exploit.  Hence, certifiers and accreditors think in 
terms of maintaining security boundaries and managing vulnerabilities from that 
perspective.   
 
Security boundaries tend to align with physical accountability, rather than 
functional, logical, process. DAAs do not certify or accredit environments that 
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introduce unknown (to them) vulnerabilities. DAAs only certify and/or accredit 
software processes that fall clearly inside their well-defined, physically 
accountable, environments. Hence, C&A arguments are usually based on 
ownership and control of physical hardware devices.   
 
Note that the virtual machine target architecture described above, i.e. the cloud-friendly 
approach, lends itself to both the architect/engineer and the certifier/accreditor 
perspective.  Indeed, an assured virtual machine Cross Domain Service, by definition, 
would capture well-defined logical functionality and managed vulnerabilities, within an 
equally well-defined and guaranteed security boundary.  
 
 
Figure 4: Virtual cloud Cross Domain Services engineered with assured logical separation can 
support dynamic implementation of any given "need-to-share" policy, e.g. Bell-LaPadula 
 
Some Logical Actions 
 
Here are some strategy recommendations for evolving Cloud Cross Domain Services and 
associated new C&A paradigms:  
 
Address all traditional classes of Cross Domain Solutions; i.e. not just transfer 
guards, but also MLS, and access solutions.   
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Explain how to leverage success of transfer solution based MLS such as in the 
near term. Explain that these transfer-based MLS solutions will always be 
relatively expensive, and relatively difficult to cloud enable, e.g. they won’t scale 
to support the most stringent tactical edge use cases.   
 
Near term realities notwithstanding, emphasize the need to establish logical 
separation within “the cloud” as generally architecturally preferable to physical 
separation.  Provide drawings to explain how to immediately use currently 
UCDMO-approved separation solutions such as NSA’s High Assurance Platform 
(HAP) and/or AFRL’s Secure View for this purpose.  
 
Describe the Cloud Multi-Level Cross Domain Services target architecture, i.e. 
dynamically composable, assured virtual machines that provide assured MLS 
services across at least one security boundary, based on emergent need-to-share 
policy.  Show how this approach addresses the C&A concerns over inheritance 
and tech refresh in context with vulnerability management and maintenance of 
security boundaries.   
 
Figure 5: Assured, dynamically configured and collapsed, virtual machines provide need-to-share 
services across cloud logical boundaries.  This approach eliminates the transfer guard bottleneck. 
 
Partner with specific, operationally motivated, C&A authorities throughout 
technical evolution of Cloud Multi-Level Cross Domain Services. 
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Add drawings that explain the C&A assurance argument, i.e. vulnerability 
management and security boundary delineation, for this near term approach.  
Show clearly, how and why multiple independent DAAs will agree to a C&A 
inheritance strategy that allows their specific domain concerns to be satisfied 
within an enterprise cloud paradigm.  Likewise, explain why they will not require 
C&A updates whenever tech refresh occurs upstream of their accredited cloud 
services.  Insertion of assured logical separation will help support the argument.  
 
Include timeline that shows migration to the target environment.  Identify specific 
pilot projects that will do the evolutionary work.   
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